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CASE NOTES
ADMIRALTY-COAST GUARD NEGLIGENCE IN RESCUE
OPERATION HELD NOT RECOVERABLE ON
BASIS OF PUBLIC POLICY
The owner of the barge Barlow brought a libel against the United
States to recover for damages to the barge which collided with a breakwater while the Coast Guard cutter Mohawk, in the course of a rescue
operation at sea, attempted to tow the barge to safety. The United States
District Court for the District of Delaware entered a decree ordering
the United States to pay the owner of the Barlow one-half of the damages suffered, and both the United States and the owner of the barge
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, on the basis
of public policy, that the United States should not be liable for the
negligence of the Coast Guard in the course of a rescue operation at sea.
P. Dougherty v. United States, 207 F. 2d 626 (C.A. 3d, 1953); certiorari
denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).
There was no dispute as to the district court's findings that the operation of the Coast Guard cutter Mohawk was negligent. The only points
in issue were whether the government could be held liable for the negligence of the Coast Guard in the course of a sea rescue, and if so, what
standard of care must be exercised?
The first and most salient consideration is whether the government
can be held liable for the negligence of the Coast Guard in the course

of a sea rescue. Section 1 of the Public Vessels Act' provides that:
A libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States,
or a petition impleading the United States, for damages caused by a public
vessel of the United States. ...

Section 2 of the same Act continues with:
Such suits shall be subject to and proceed in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter 20 of this title (The Suits in Admiralty, Merchant Vessels Act of
March 9, 1920)2 ... insofar as the same are not inconsistent herewith.
143 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C.A. S 781 (1953).
241 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 741-752 (1953).
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Section 3 of the Merchant Vessels Act 3 provides that:
Such suits shall proceed and shall be heard and determined according to the
principles of law and to the rules of practice obtaining in like cases between
private parties.
This statute was held by the United States Supreme Court to impose
upon the United States the same liability as is imposed by the admiralty
4
law on the private shipowner.
The instant case held that for reasons of public policy there should be
no liability for Coast Guard negligence in the course of a sea rescue,
the court giving as its reason that the Coast Guard should not be exposed to an obligation in addition to the possible loss of life and loss of
status in their chosen careers.
It is apparent that the court of appeals refused to apply the clear cut
language of the Public Vessels Act to the case at hand. That the Coast
Guard is an agency of the United States Government has never been
questioned; that a Coast Guard cutter functions in only a public capacity
is clear to every citizen. Hence saying that the United States is not liable
for the negligence of the Coast Guard in the course of a sea rescue
appears to be a contradiction of the Public Vessels Act.5"
The dissent in the instant case summed up the matter clearly and concisely when it stated that the majority opinion laid down a principle
which would relieve the United States of any liability whatever for any
fault or misfeasance of the Coast Guard during the course of a rescue
operation at sea. The dissent went on to say that the majority was substituting sentiment for the plain provisions of the Public Vessels Act,
and that the instant case dealt with an act of Congress clearly expressing the legislative intent, and that the conclusion should have been that
the United States had to answer for the Mohawk's negligence.
Not to hold the government liable in the instant case is to place the
Coast Guard on an unapproachable pedestal apart from all other agencies of the government which are subject to the Public Vessels Act,
when, in fact, the Act does not specify immunity to any branch of the
government.
The instant case is the first case in which the United States has been
held liable by a United States district court for Coast Guard negligence
in the course of a sea rescue, but the idea that the United States might
be held liable for a Coast Guard vessel's torts is not a novel one. Of
eight cases dealing with this problem, none are prior in date to 1950,
an indication that the problem is increasing in importance. Six of these
3 Ibid., at 526 and S 743.
4 Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
543 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C.A. S781 (1953).
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eight cases will cast little, if any, light on our problem, since three are
still pending,6 two were voluntarily dismissed,7 and one was dismissed
on motion."
In the case of Ladd v. United States,9 the United States was held liable
for Coast Guard negligence. This case can be distinguished from the
instant case in that no rescue was involved, merely negligent operation
of a Coast Guard cutter. What makes the Ladd case so important is
that the United States was held liable, and even though the case is not
concerned with a rescue operation, it poses the question as to why the
United States should be held liable for the negligent operation of a Coast
Guard cutter only when it is not in the course of a rescue operation.
The latest case in point is Page v. United States' ° which involved
alleged negligence in the course of a sea rescue, and although the United
States is not held liable, the decision is in accord with the Ladd case.
The government was not liable because the court held that there was no
negligence, but in dicta, the court stated that:
Under the Public Vessels Act, the United States is liable for damages caused
by her public vessels and this liability covers damages resulting from negligence of personnel in the operation of such vessels. Damages attributed to the
negligence of Coast Guard vessels and personnel may be recovered under this
act.'
However, the court in the Page case left unsettled the question of
liability for Coast Guard negligence in the course of a sea rescue since
the court refused to decide that problem because the circumstances of
the case did not constitute negligence. Therefore, it would seem that
the problem is one that requires clarification, and to deny certiorari is
to refuse to render a decision on an issue which has been presented more
6 Geerston v. United States (The Anna G-CG303 11, W.D. Pa., Adm. No. 174)Alleged negligence in the course of rescue-tried at Erie, April 1, 1952 and not yet
submitted; Charles W. Smith, Inc. v. United States (The Olivia Brown-Navesink),
(S.D. N.Y., Adm. No. 165-387)-alleged negligence in course of rescue, suit at issue
since October, 1950; CGC Yocona-Kallie P., Hansen v. United States (D.C. Ore.
No. 6634)-suit begun September, 1952.
7Johnson v. Sapio, United States impleaded (The Tradewinds III-CG36393), (D.
N.J. Civil No. 752-50)-Coast Guard impleaded by fishing party boatman sued by
passenger who broke leg in course of rescue, impleader voluntarily dismissed on day
of trial at Camden, November 14, 1951. Friesenborg v. The Peter Maersk and United
States (The Irma-Pauline-Peter Maersk-CGC Marion), (E.D. Va., Adm. No. 7423)suit by rescued vessel hit by the Maersk against both the Maersk and Coast Guard
cutter which was towing the rescued vessel. Voluntarily dismissed as to the government on July 28, 1951.
8 Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Mass., 1951).

997 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va., 1951).
10 105 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. La., 1952).
11 Ibid., at 102.
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in the last four years than in the previous entire history of the Coast
Guard.
Assuming that the United States can be held liable for the negligence
of the Coast Guard in sea rescue cases, the problem then is to determine
what the standard of care should be. In other words, should a breach
of duty be determined on the basis of gross negligence or is the standard
reasonable care? The majority opinion stated the basis to be that of gross
negligence, a holding which the dissent opposed heatedly.
That the United States is under no civil liability for the failure of
the Coast Guard to come to the aid of a vessel in distress is established
by the provision of the statute 12 regulating the Coast Guard. Nowhere
in the statute is the obligation to rescue expressed. Hence, liability can
be imposed only when an actual rescue has been undertaken and performed in a negligent or wrongful manner. In Lacey v. United States,"3
the court held that nowhere in the statute was a right created to be rescued so that an award of civil damages could be awarded for failure
of the Coast Guard to attempt to rescue one in distress. Therefore,
liability can only be predicated on the common law rule of assumption
of duty 14 or on the liability of a salving ship to the ship in distress once
salvage has been undertaken.
The majority, in holding that gross negligence must be shown for
recovery, made no distinction as to whether the Coast Guard should be
viewed as a salvor or as a good Samaritan, indicating in the opinion that
under either case gross negligence must be shown in order to establish
a breach of duty. Whether a Coast Guard cutter should be viewed as a
good Samaritan or a salvor should not raise any problem, since, if a
cutter is viewed as a good Samaritan, the common law rule of ordinary
care applies.15 The basic problem exists when the Coast Guard is viewed
as a salvor. It has been stated:
A salvor is a person who without any particular relation to a ship in distress, proffers useful service and gives it as a volunteer adventurer without any
pre-existing covenant that connected him with the duty of employing himself
for the preservation of the ship. 6
The instant case states that the standard of care required, no matter what
the type of ship, is slight care, or the absence of gross negligence, and
17
cites numerous cases which the majority feels supports its argument.
1263 Stat. 496, 501 (1949), 14 U.S.C.A. §§ 2 and 88 (1953).
13 98 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Mass., 1951).
15 Ibid.
14Prosser, Torts S 32 (1941).
' 6 The Hope, 35 U.S. 108 (1836).
17 Dorrington v. City of Detroit, 223 Fed. 232 (C.A. 6th, 1915); The S. C. Schenck,
158 Fed. 54 (C.A. 6th, 1907); The Daniel Kern, 27 F. 2d 920 (W.D. Wash., 1928);
The Henry Steers, Jr., 110 Fed. 578 (E.D. N.Y., 1901).
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8 case is cited as setting down the rule that gross
The Henry Steers Jr.1
negligence is required. It is difficult to see how the court can derive this
from the Steers case when the court in that case stated, "The rule of
general application in cases of salvage is . . .. [the] use [of] . . . care and
skill that would be exercised by persons of ordinary skill and prudence
in the business undertaken.""' However, the majority, in rendering the
opinion in the instant case, apparently confused the statements in the
Steers case as to the requirement of gross negligence to forfeit the salvage award entirely with the required standard of care of a salvor in the
course of a salvage operation. It has been held that gross negligence
works a total denial or forfeiture of salvage awards. 20 The importance
of the Steers case is that it shows the distinction between the requirement of gross negligence to reduce the salvage award, and ordinary
negligence to render a salvor liable for a negligently performed salvage
operation.
Neither does the S. C. Schenck2 ' case, relied on by the majority, set
down the gross negligence rule since the facts do not correspond to
those in the instant case. In the Schenck case the rescue was never made;
it was ineffectual at the outset. Hence, there could be no negligence during the course of a sea rescue. Also, the Schenck case was one of great
emergency, and the standard care required in an emergency has never,
even under the common law rule of torts, been as strict as where calm
reflection is possible. 22 Another case cited by the majority of the court
which does not seem to support their view is Dorrington v. City of
Detroit,23 which held that "Persons undertaking a salvage service are
bound to exercise reasonable care and such skill as persons performing
such services ordinarily possess .... -24 It was further held in the Dorrington case that when liability is sought to be fastened solely because
of an ineffectual salvage attempt, no independent injury resulting, liability would not attach if there was evidence of good faith and absence of
culpable negligence or wilful misconduct. It is obvious that this rule
will not fit the instant case because in the instant case the service was
not ineffectual.
The last case relied on by the majority is The Daniel Kern.25 In that
case the libelant did not recover because of the failure to establish any
negligence. The court held that salvors in good faith are held to reasonable judgment such as a man of ordinary prudence would use when
called upon to protect his own property. The majority in that case
22

18 110 Fed. 578 (E.D. N.Y., 1901).
19 Ibid., at 581.
20

The Mulhouse, 17 Fed. Cas. 962

21

158 Fed. 54 (C.A. 6th, 1907).

Prosser, Torts S 37 (1941).

23 223 Fed. 232 (C.A. 6th, 1915).
(1859).

24Ibid., at 241.
2527 F. 2d 920 (W.D. Wash., 1928).
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relies on the statement in the Schenck case to the effect that there is no
responsibility if the service was rendered in good faith, without clear
evidence of culpable negligence or wilful misconduct. The court then
went on to say that it was apparent that reasonable judgment and skill
xAere being exercised since no testimony of any culpability or wilfulness
was given. The Kern case does not evidence adherence to a gross negligence rule because the explanations of both ordinary negligence and
gross negligence were inserted merely for the purpose of showing that
neither was present.
In conclusion, it appears that the United States should be held liable
for the negligence of the Coast Guard in the course of a sea rescue, and
that the standard of care to be imposed should be that of reasonable care.
Although this would seem to be placing an undue burden on the government since the duty to rescue is not one imposed by law but assumed
voluntarily, the fact remains that there is a federal statute making all
government vessels liable for negligence. Until this statute is amended or
repealed, the court is duty-bound to apply it, and since the statute is
unambiguous, it would seem that this court, in saying that the legislature
did not intend to include vessels used in rescue operations, has usurped
its power. It has created an exception which the legislature did not see
fit to make.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SURVIVAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
HELD MATTER OF PROCEDURE
Plaintiffs and defendant's intestate, all residents of California, were
involved in an auto collision in Arizona, the latter dying as a result of
injuries thereby sustained. After the appointment of defendant as administrator of decedent's estate, each of the plaintiffs brought damage
actions in California, which were rejected. Separate actions were filed
against the decedent's estate, to which the defendant demurred and
moved for abatement, since the statutes of Arizona made no provision
for survival of causes of action after the death of the tortfeasor. By
statute in California, causes of action for negligent torts survive the
death of the tortfeasor, and can be maintained against the administrator
or executor of his estate.' The trial court granted motions to abate and
the appeals of plaintiffs were consolidated. The Supreme Court of California reversed the lower court's decision, holding survival of a cause
of action upon death of the tortfeasor a matter of procedure and, therefore, governed by the law of the forum, in accordance with the rule
from conflict of laws. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944
(1953).
1Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 956.

